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ABSTRACT 
Iran has suffered ever-increasing domestic energy consumption mostly due to its price 
controlling policy. If the trend continues, it will become a pure importer in the following decades. 
To avoid that unlucky fate, Iran started the energy subsidies reform on December 2010. It 
increased domestic energy and agricultural prices up to 20 times, making it the first major oil-
exporting country to reduce substantially implicit energy subsidies. The paper studies the 
inflationary impact of the energy subsidies reform on different non-energy sectors and urban and 
rural households in Iran. For this purpose, the input-output price model of Iran is made and 
energy cross-price elasticities of non-energy sectors are derived. The results evidence the 
tremendous effects of the complete reform on the production and consumption prices. 
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1.  Introduction 
Despite some limited and specific benefits, energy subsidies have imposed vast expenses on 
societies. Several literatures overviewed the economic, environmental, and social impacts 
(UNEP, 2003, 2008; Ellis, 2010). From economic perspective, subsidies can increase energy 
consumption, reduce incentives for energy efficiency, decrease foreign exchange revenues, drain 
and divert public budgets, increase countries’ dependence on imports, undermine investment in 
alternative energy sources and technologies, substitute energy with capital and labor, lead to 
shortages or costly rationing systems, and finally promote smuggling and corruption.  While 
energy subsidies encourage consumption, they increase local and global emissions, water 
pollution, landscape destruction, and depletion of non-renewable fossil-fuel stocks. At last, 
energy subsidies are featured by grievous social impacts. Usually, subsidies benefit the rich more 
than the poor, do not target types of energy more beneficial to the poor, divert government 
money from social programs, and make the poor suffer local emissions and consequently 
diseases made by the rich. 
Different studies attempted to estimate energy subsidies around the world or for specific 
countries (Larsen and Shah, 1992; Myers and Kent, 2001; EIA, 2007; Coady et al., 2006). What 
they found is subsidies are large and the developing countries account for the bulk of them. They 
also suggest that most of energy subsidies in developing countries benefit consumers by 
controlling energy prices, whereas they target producers in developed countries in the form of 
direct payments or support for research and development (UNEP, 2008). Larsen and Shah (1992) 
estimated fossil-fuel consumption subsidies from under-pricing alone at around 230 billion USD 
per year that two-third has been paid  by  Former Soviet Union. Myers and Kent (2001) 
approximated net global consumption subsidies at 235 billion USD  per year. EIA (2007) 
discovers that energy subsidies in the twenty largest non-OECD countries amount to around 220 
billion USD at 2005, of which subsidies to fossil fuels account for around 170 billion USD. 
Assuming that subsidies per unit of energy consumed are of the same magnitude in other non-
OECD countries and that OECD consumption subsidies are minimal, around 300 billion USD or 
0.7 percent of world GDP paid for energy subsidies in the respective year. Coady et al (2006) 
also study the magnitude and distribution of fuel subsidies in specific developing countries. Page | 3  
 
Aside from the considerable share of subsidies in their GDP (2% ‒ 4.3%), Coady et al. (2006) 
found out that energy subsidies are badly targeted in all of the analyzed countries.  
Among the developing countries, Gupta et al. (2002) found oil-exporting countries as the 
main net subsidizers of petroleum. Their study demonstrates that implicit subsidies in major oil-
exporting countries were averagely equal to 3.0 percent of GDP and 15.2 percent of explicit 
government expenditures in 1999. In addition, EIA (2007) reveals that major energy subsidizers 
are oil-exporters. Russia had the largest subsidies in dollar terms at 2005, amounting to about 40 
billion USD, most of which went to natural gas. Iran was second while it subsidized mostly oil 
products amounting 37 billion USD at the same year. China, Saudi Arabia, India, Indonesia, 
Ukraine, Egypt, Venezuela, and Kazakhstan are the next largest energy subsidizers which are 
mostly oil-producers. 
Iran, as the third main petroleum exporter in OPEC, has suffered ever-increasing domestic 
energy consumption mostly due to its price controlling policy. While domestic final  energy 
consumption devoured 5% of total energy production in 1967, the ratio increased to 42% in 2009 
(MoE,  2010).  If the trend continues, Iran will become undoubtedly  a pure importer in the 
following decades. To avoid that unlucky fate, Iran started the energy subsidies  reform on 
December 2010. It increased domestic energy and agricultural prices up to 20 times, making it 
the first major oil-exporting country to reduce substantially implicit energy subsidies (Guillaume 
et al., 2011). The  paper  studies the inflationary impact of the energy subsidies reform on 
different non-energy sectors and urban and rural households in Iran. For this purpose, the input-
output price model of Iran is made and energy cross-price elasticities of non-energy sectors are 
derived. The results evidence the tremendous effects of the complete reform on the production 
and consumption prices. 
The paper is organized as follows. The second section introduces the trends of some main 
energy indicators in Iran. The third section explains the energy pricing and energy subsidies 
reform in Iran. While the literature would be reviewed in section 4, section 5 explains the 
methodology of the input-output price model. Finally, the results would be presented in section 6. 
The last section will conclude and propose a number of policy implications.      
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2. Energy indicators in Iran 
Iran is a country in Central Eurasia and Western Asia with a population of over 74 million 
(SCI, 2010). It is a country of particular geostrategic significance because of its location in the 
Middle East and Central Eurasia. In addition, it is the eighteenth largest country in the world, 
with an area of 1,648,000 km2 (SCI, 2010). 
Although oil and gas production has accounted for an increasingly smaller share of real GDP, 
oil and gas revenues remain the main source of foreign exchange earnings and fiscal revenues. 
The share of oil in real GDP fell from an average of 40 percent of real GDP in the 1960s to about 
10.5 percent in the last decade, reflecting average annual non-oil GDP growth rate of 5.7 percent 
compared to only 4.4 percent for oil and gas GDP. Oil and gas receipts accounted for about 72 
percent of export revenues in the last decade, despite rapid non-oil export growth. Oil and gas 
revenues also account for 65 percent of fiscal revenues, and are likely to remain the main source 
of financing for development projects in the foreseeable future notwithstanding recent efforts to 
diversify fiscal revenues (Guillaume and Zytek, 2010; Guillaume et al., 2011; IMF, 2011) 
Table 1 illustrates the energy balance of Iran in 2008. From the balance, Iran could produce 
2428.4 MBOE of different types of energy, mainly petroleum and refined petroleum products 
(66%) and natural gas (33%). Near to 44% of total produced energy was exported, as the main 
source of fiscal revenue, and the remainder was consumed domestically.  The main energy 
consumers in Iran were residential, public, and commercial sectors, transportation sector, and 
industrial sector that accounted for 37%, 25%, and 23% of total energy demand. Following the 
production pattern, the main consumed energy carriers were fossil fuels. Petroleum products and 
natural gas accounted for 47.9% and 42.6% of total energy consumption, respectively. The share 
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Production  1606.6  805.3  7.8  5.6  2.9  0.1  -  2428.4 
Import  84.3  44.5  3.7  -  -  -  1.0  133.5 
Export  -1029.8  -29.7  -0.2  -  -  -  -2.3  -1062.0 
Energy consumption 






















82.8  277.1  0.1  5.6  -  -  49.4  415.0 
Industrial sector  73.0  147.3  0.3  -  -  -  32.2  252.8 
Transportation sector  269.8  11.6  -  -  -  -  0.1  281.6 
Agricultural sector  27.9  1.5  -  -  -  -  12.5  41.9 
Other sectors  -  -  -  -  -  -  2.4  2.4 
Non-energy 
utilization  79.9  37.7  2.5  -  -  -  -  120.1 
Total energy 




Fig. 1 and 2 show the trend of fossil fuels and electricity consumption in Iran over the period 
1973‒2008. Despite a temporary decline in consumption of gas oil, fuel oil, and kerosene at the 
end of 1990s, the consumption of all types of fuels have increased enormously over the last 
decades. In the years after the Revolution (1979), the consumption of gas oil, fuel oil, gasoline, 
kerosene, LPG, natural gas, and electricity have grown annually 4.17%, 5.07%, 5.48%, 1.06%, 
3.48%, 9.24%, and 8.54%, respectively. Fig. 3 compares the growth rates of GDP, final energy 
consumption, and population in Iran over the period 1968‒2008. Almost, the growth rate of final 
energy consumption has been greater than the growth rates of GDP and population. It reflects the 
low share of energy expenditure in total spending of households and cost of producers due to low 
energy prices.   Page | 6  
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As it is obvious in Fig. 4, the consumption pattern of some sectors has changed essentially 
since 1970. Although the predominant fuels in transportation sector are still refined petroleum 
products, electricity and natural gas have substituted with petroleum products in residential, 
public, and commercial sector, industrial sector, and agricultural sector. Iran has the second 
largest natural gas reservoirs in the world and invested hugely to increase its production. In 
addition, it followed an ambitious and prolonged plan to expand the domestic natural gas 
pipelines, especially because it is a clean fuel and substitutable to petroleum,  which can be 
exported more easily. While the extraction of natural gas started in 1972, it accounted for 
66.38%, 58.29%, 4.12% and 3.52% of total energy consumption in residential, public, and 
commercial sector, industrial sector, transportation sector, and agricultural sector respectively in 
2008. As well, electricity accounted for 12.42%, 12.73%, 0.05% and 29.47% in the respective 
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Fig. 5 shows the trend of energy intensity (energy consumption/GDP) in Iran as a whole and 
by fuel over the period 1973-2007. The graph illustrates when total energy intensity was 0.66 
BOE/Million IR. Rials in 1973, it increased extremely to 2.18 after three decades. The main 
contributor is undoubtedly natural gas which accounted for 69% of total energy intensity in 2007. 
Due to the low price of natural gas (1.03 cents/m3), the energy intensity of natural gas increased 
from 0.42 BOE/Million IR in 1973 to 1.51 in 2007, that shows an averagely 6.23% growth rate 




Fig. 5. Trend of energy intensity by fuel type in Iran (1973-2007) 
 
 
3. Energy pricing and energy subsidies reform 
Domestic energy prices have historically been set administratively in Iran. Fig.  6  and  7 
depict the level and trend of nominal and real energy prices  over  the  period  1991‒2008. 
Apparently, the nominal prices have been increased by government through the period of study. 
In the last decade (1998-2008), nominal prices of LPG, gasoline, natural gas, gas oil, kerosene, 
electricity, and fuel oil were increased 10.6%, 11.1%, 9.2%, 5.1%, 5.1%, 7.5%, and 6.6%, 
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makes an inverse picture. In the same period, real prices were growing -3.6%, -3.1%, -4.7%, -
8.3%,  -8.3%,  -6.3% and -7.1%  respectively, that evidence the energy prices got cheaper 
relatively. 
 
Source: MoE (2010) 
Fig. 6. Nominal energy prices in Iran (1991‒2008) 
 
Source: MoE (2010) 
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IEA (1999) defines an energy subsidy as any government action that concerns primarily the 
energy sector that lowers the cost of energy production, raises the price received by energy 
producers or lowers the price paid by energy consumers. Table  2  shows an approximate of 
energy subsidy in Iran by sector and energy type in 2008. All the figures are calculated by taking 
the gap between the domestic and global prices, adding all of direct financial payments which 
reduce the final prices for consumers. Table 2 indicates that all types of subsidies in energy 
sector were totally near to 442,033 billion IR. Rials (44.5 billion USD), or 6,002 thousand IR. 
Rials per person (605 USD) in 2008. Among the consumers, transportation sector accounted for 
40.2% of total energy subsidies. The next most significant consumers were residential and 
industrial sectors that accounted for 25.2% and 17.8% of total energy subsidies, respectively. 
Commercial sector received the least amount of subsidy (3.6%). From the fuel perspective, most 
of subsidies are paid for gas oil (27.3%), and then electricity and gasoline fuels (26.2% and 
18.2% respectively). The least amount of subsidies was paid for LPG which has the smallest 
share in total energy consumption. Total amount of energy subsidies is equal to about 11% of 




Energy subsidy in Iran at 2008 (Billion IR Rials) 
Sector  Residence  Industry  Agriculture  Transport  Commerce  Public  Total  %  % of 
GDP 
Gasoline  -  285.8  124.8  79914.6  2.4  235.7  80563.3  18.2  0.020 
Kerosene  319  239.5  -  80.7  252.1  26364.5  27255.7  6.2  0.007 
Gas oil  2724.8  12809.9  18649.3  80214.6  1915.1  4486.6  120800.3  27.3  0.030 
Fuel oil  -  23505.7  -  12837.8  3841.1  791.2  40975.7  9.3  0.010 
LPG  9619.4  1232  -  2421.2  -  -  13272.7  3  0.003 
Electricity  47596  27321  15006  134.3  8673.3  17044.5  115775.5  26.2  0.028 
Natural 
gas  25173.9  13411.3  209.9  2100.8  1448.6  1045.3  43389.7  9.8  0.011 
Total  111478.6  78817.9  34071.2  177623.2  16119.9  23922.2  442033  100  0.108 
%  25.2  17.8  7.7  40.2  3.6  5.4  100  -  - 
% of GDP  0.027  0.019  0.008  0.044  0.004  0.006  0.108  -  - 
Source: MoE (2010) and author calculation - 1 USD = 9,917 Rials Page | 12  
 
 
Different international organizations had encouraged Iran to start an energy subsidies reform. 
For instance, IMF reported that implementation of the reform has the following benefits 
(Guillaume and Zytek, 2010): 
•  In the short-term, it  strengthens  Iran’s current account and external reserve position and 
reduces the volatility in government capital spending. In the medium-term, energy allocation 
efficiency would improve significantly and energy intensity would decline, improving the 
overall competitiveness of the Iranian economy. 
•  Higher revenues resulting from the liberalization of energy prices would help generate the 
resources  needed to maintain and expand energy production and support  economic 
development and employment growth. 
•  Higher energy prices would support Iran’s diversification of energy sources. 
•  Increased earnings from energy sales could allow the government to make the distribution of 
benefits from Iran’s hydrocarbon resources more equitable.  
After decades disputing about the necessity of subsidies reform, the parliament approved the 
Reform Act on January 5, 2010. The Reform Act envisaged the replacement of product subsidies 
with targeted transfers to the population, with some assistance to Iranian companies and the 
government. The Reform Act stipulated that households would receive at least fifty percent of 
the increase in revenues derived from the reform. Initially, the benefits were to be paid in cash, 
while in a second phase, some of the additional revenues were to be used to support higher social 
benefits and public goods. Thirty percent of the additional revenues were to be used to assist 
Iranian  companies restructure to adjust to the new, dramatically higher energy costs. The 
remaining  twenty percent of the additional revenues would go to the government to cover 
government’s own higher energy bill. Article 15 of the Reform Act authorized the government to 
establish a new Subsidy Targeting Organization to ensure efficient centralized management of 
the reform.
1   
On December 19, 2010, Iran increased domestic energy and agricultural prices by up to 20 
times, making it the first major oil-exporting country to reduce substantially  implicit energy 
subsidies. In the next phases, prices would be increased stepwise until all the subsidies would be 
                                                             
1 The Reform Act is available at this address: http://www.icana.ir/News/Parliament/2010/1/52183/0/Default.aspx. 
The English version can be accessed in Guillaume et al. (2011) Page | 13  
 
removed. Since starting the first phase, the government has compensated the burdened charges 
by transferring 450,000 IR. Rials (near to 40 USD) per person to the head of households.  
As the reform is newborn, it is too early to evaluate its effects on the economy. However, 
looking to the published official data  shows that the first phase of the reform increased the 
monthly inflation rate averagely 1%. Fig. 8 depicts Consumer Price Index (CPI) at urban areas in 




Fig. 8. Consumer Price Index (CPI) at urban areas before and after starting the reform 
in Iran, 2004/2005=100 
  
4. Literature review 
Several literatures studied the impact of new energy prices on total prices at production and 
consumption levels. The input-output price model is an approach used to analyze the effects 
caused by fluctuations in energy prices. For instance, Liop and Pié (2008) analyzed the effects of 
a tax on intermediate energy use and a reduction in intermediate energy demand on production 
and consumption prices in Catalan. Using a competitive price and a mark-up price formulation in 
the framework of an input-output model, they found a tax on intermediate energy uses increases 
the consumer price index, and this decreases the intermediate demand for energy and has a 
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intermediate demand for energy not only reduces energy consumption, but also has no effects on 
prices and positive impact on private real income. Liop (2008) used the same research questions 
and methodology for Spanish water sector. The results of this study are completely the same as 
before.  Nguyen (2008) studied the impacts of increasing electricity tariff to the long-run 
marginal cost on prices of other products in Vietnam using a static input-output approach. He 
ascertained that such an increase would drive up the prices of all other sectors. While it would be 
difficult to implement this increase at one time, the author proposed to increase the electricity 
tariff gradually.    
Liu et al. (2009) evaluate how the alternative policies,  such as  increasing the prices of 
intermediate electricity use and implementing energy saving projects and reducing intermediate 
electricity use, may affect production prices, consumption prices, and real income of rural and 
urban households in Chinese economy. Applying an adjusted input-output price model, they 
found increase in energy price causes a general increase of production and consumption prices, 
while decreases household real income  especially in urban areas. Combination of two 
complementary policies may somewhat diminishes  the prices.  Combining the portfolio and 
input-output approaches, Suzuki and Uchiyama (2010) measured the risk of an increase in the 
producer price in Japanese non-energy sectors due to an increase in the price of imported fossil 
fuels.  They also measured the energy cross-price elasticities in Japanese non-energy sectors, 
using an input-output price model. Their results indicate that almost all non-energy sectors have 
reduced their risk as the result of improvement in energy usage by upstream sectors.    
Some of the international studies have investigated the effects of subsidy phase out in the 
economy of Iran (Birol et al., 1995; Jensen and Tarr, 2003; AlShehabi, 2011). For instance, Birol 
et al. (1995) tried to quantify the potential gains from both the removal of energy subsidies and 
the improvement in autonomous energy efficiency in Iran and two other oil-exporting countries. 
In a scenario that domestic energy prices arrive at international prices and energy efficiencies 
improve to autonomous energy-efficiency improvement rate, they found the savings in the 
economy of Iran could be as high as 20% over the period 1993-2005. Using a multisector 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model, Jensen and Tarr (2003) estimate the gains of 
tariffication of nontariff barriers, lowering the tariffs, unification of the exchange rate for import 
purchases, and energy pricing reform in Iran. Regarding the relative importance of the reforms, Page | 15  
 
they found that the largest gains come from the energy pricing reform, as this reform alone 
results in an estimated gain of 32% of consumption.  
AlShehabi (2011) studied the effects of eliminating crude oil and fuel oil subsidies on the 
labor market using two alternative policy options. The first option redistributes additional 
revenues as extra income to households, while the second directs revenue into increased 
investment. He found even though real GDP and household welfare rises in the first scenario, the 
wages and quantities employed of labor suffer due to the Dutch disease effect and the increased 
costs of inputs. In the second scenario and in the short time, channeling of revenues cause a 
contraction in the labor market, nevertheless it expands the market over time  due to capital 
accumulation effects and shifts in the structure of economy. 
The pitfall of such studies is disregarding the negative effects which may slow down the 
pace of the reform or in extreme cases, stop the policy. Several studies have been domestically 
carried out to estimate the economic effects of energy subsidies reform in Iran. For instance, 
Khiabani (2008) used a standard CGE model to examine the effects of increase in the price of 
energy carriers on production costs, inflation and economic welfare of different income deciles. 
The results indicate that if the fuel prices arrive at the international prices, total inflation rate 
increases by 35 percent, output and employment decreases by 4.5 and 6.8 percent respectively, 
and the government revenue rises by 40 percent. Using an autoregressive distributed lag model 
(ARDL),  Ghaderi and Estedlal (2009) measured the effects  of  an increase in the price of 
electricity by quantifying compensating variation (CV) and dead weight loss (DWL) of Iranian 
residential consumers. They show that although CV and DWL is larger in higher income groups, 
lower income groups will be affected more due to bigger expenditure share of electricity. 
Applying a CGE model and using a Micro Consistent Matrix, Manzoor et al. (2010) 
examined the effects of energy implicit and explicit subsidies phase out in Iran. They concluded 
that the policy increases the inflation rate around 57.9 to 69.07 percent, reduces the total output 
about 2.11 to 2.22 percent, and declines the household welfare around 11.80 to 12.62 percent. 
Akhoond  zade et al. (2011) used an Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) to appraise the 
welfare effects of energy price reform in Iranian construction and transportation sectors. The 
results demonstrated that the share of energy cost in total expenditure in transportation sector is Page | 16  
 
more in the middle income groups. This ratio declines in construction sector as income grows. 
The CV is larger in the higher income groups and more significant in the urban areas. 
Using input-output and social accounting matrix (SAM) price models, researchers studied 
the effects of energy subsidies reform  in Iran.  Perme (2005) indicated  that  removing the 
subsidies of refined petroleum products, natural gas, and electricity would increase the average 
national price index by 19.52, 11.07, and 4.83 percent, respectively. If all the energy subsidies 
are removed contemporaneously, the price index would be raised by 35.4 percent. Sharifi et al. 
(2008)  showed that the most affected sectors from energy subsidies reform are non-ferrous 
mineral product, forestry, and refined petroleum product. They found that electricity has the 
highest inflationary impacts among the energy carriers. Shahmoradi et al. (2010)  found that 
increasing the inland fuel prices to the international level will increase consumer and producer 
price indices by 108 and 118 percent, respectively. The freight and passenger rail transportation 
would be impressed primarily by 263 percent increase in service prices. In the absence of any 
protection program, social welfare would be decayed 79 percent, significantly in rural areas. 
Finally, the study of Heydari and Perme (2010) evidences that removing the fuels and bread 
subsidies increases the expenditures of urban and rural households at least 33 and 40 percent, 
respectively.              
5. Methodology 
5.1 Input-output price model 
The input-output price model or as usually called the Leontief price model is the analytical 
framework that can examine the effects of energy price fluctuations in a static manner. The 
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where X,  Z, and V are total outlay, transaction, and value added matrixes and i depicts the unity 
vector. Substituting  x A Z ˆ =  and postmultiplying by 
1 ˆ − X , 
c V A i i
X V X AX i X X
′ + ′ = ′
′ + ′ = ′
− − − 1 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ
                                                                                                    (2) 
where 
1 ˆ − ′ = ′ X V Vc  . The right hand side of Eq. (2) is the cost of inputs per unit of output. Output 
prices are set equal to total cost of production, so each price is equal to unity. The vector i can be 
interpreted as the index prices in the base year. If we denote these base year index prices by P 
vector, the input-output price model is as Eq. (3) (Miller and Blair, 2009). 
c c V P A P or V A P P + ′ = ′ + ′ = ′                                                                                       (3) 
Following Suzuki and Uchiyama (2010), we make two modifications to Eq. (3). First, 












































                                                                                           (4) 
In Eq. (4), Pe and Pn indicate the index prices in energy and non-energy sectors, Vce and Vcn 
indicate the value added in energy and non-energy sectors per unit of their production, and as an 
example in technical matrix (A), Aen show the share of energy input transferred to non-energy 
sectors in the total outlay of non-energy sector. In a country like Iran that the energy prices are 
set administratively, price of energy is an exogenous variable. While the production costs of non-
energy products can be influenced by the prices of energy carriers, the only significant equation 
that can be derived from Eq. (4) is as follows. 
[ ]
[ ] cn e en nn n
cn e en n nn
cn n nn e en n
V P A A I P
V P A P A I
V P A P A P
+ ′ ′ − =
+ ′ = ′ −
+ ′ + ′ =
−1
                                                                                                  (5)  
Eq. (5) can be used to examine the impact of an exogenously given change in energy prices. 
The assumption ΔVcn=0 yields the general form of the price model. Page | 18  
 
[ ] e en nn n P A A I P ∆ ′ ′ − = ∆
−1
                                                                                                (6) 
The second modification is extraction of imported non-energy commodities from the price 
model. Indeed, domestic energy prices are not the determinants of the prices of imported non-
energy products. For this purpose, Eq. (6) needs to be modified using the import coefficient 
vector of non-energy products ( n M ˆ ), where the elements indicate the ratio of the imported non-
energy products to the total demand of the respective sector. 




− − = ∆
−1
). ˆ (                                                                                (7) 
Where  nn n nn A M I B ). ˆ ( − =  , Eq. (7) can be rewritten as Eq. (8). 
e en nn n P A B I P ∆ ′  

 
 ′ − = ∆
−1
                                                                                                (8) 
In addition to analyzing the effects on production prices, we can examine the impact of 
energy  subsidies reform on consumption prices. The consumption  prices  can be defined 
endogenously using a normalized basket of goods, which define the weights of the final prices 











.                                                                                                               (9) 
where Pj are the prices of production and Cj/C represents the share of final consumption for each 
good with respect to all the goods consumed.  We can also obtain an approximation of the 
influence of new energy prices on the consumer’s real income. In particular, the changes in 
private real income (ΔI) can be calculated by Eq. (10). 
∑ ∑ ∑
= = =












R C p P C P C P I I I
1 1 1
) (                                                           (10) 
where Pj  and P
R
j  indicate the consumption price of good j before and after the reform, 
respectively. The results help us to estimate an approximation of compensatory payments that the Page | 19  
 
government should transfer to the consumers to cover their increasing expenditure, at least in the 
short-run. 
 
5.2 Decomposition of the price model 
While the Leontief price model assumes that the economic structure is not altering through 
the time, Eq. (8) links the price change of non-energy products to the price change of energy 
carriers. If Eq. (8) is decomposed into the constituent parts, impact of every part can be tracked. 
When our purpose is studying the impact of energy subsidies reform on the price of non-energy 
products, the decomposition in our study would be restricted to the price of energy carriers. 
Therefore, ΔPe can be decomposed into the increase in the prices of each of final energies as 
LPG FO GO KE GA NG ELE e P P P P P P P P ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆                                                (11) 
where ELE, NG, GA, KE, GO, FO, and LPG indicate electricity, natural gas, gasoline, kerosene, 
gas oil, fuel oil, and LPG, respectively. Substituting Eq. (11) in Eq. (8) yields 
[ ] LPG FO GO KE GA NG ELE en nn n P P P P P P P A B I P ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ ′ ′ − = ∆
−1 ) (                       (12) 
Multiplication of the first term in the latter decomposed parts reveals how much the rate of 
producer prices in non-energy sectors would be increased by changing the price rate of each fuel. 
When all the diagonal elements in ΔPe are set to one, ΔPn represents the cross-price elasticity of 
each fuel in the non-energy sectors. The elasticities obtained from Eq. (12) can be decomposed 
into direct and indirect impacts by substituting the Leontief inverse matrix with the equivalent 
power series. For instance, where the first term of Eq. (13) indicates the  direct  impact of 
electricity price change, the remainder reflects the price effects in the next rounds (Suzuki and 
Uchiyama, 2010). 
ELE en nn nn ELE en nn ELE n P A B B I P A B I P ∆ ′ + + + = ∆ ′ ′ − = ∆
− ) ( ) (
2 1
.                                            (13) 
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6. Empirical results 
In this study, Iran’s national input-output table 2001 is used which is the last official survey-
based table published by Statistical Center of Iran (SCI, 2005). The original table consists of 91 
commodities that aggregated into 37 sectors for simplicity. Table 3 depicts the structure of our 
aggregated input-output table that comprises a primary energy (crude oil and natural gas), final 
energies (sectors 2-10), and non-energy products (sectors 11-37). Due to the low share of coal in 
production of final energies in Iran, this sector (11) is shifted to non-energy sectors. In addition, 
while the subject of the paper is restricted to the energy subsidies reform, the prices in sectors (3) 
and (10), i.e. water and the other refined petroleum products, are assumed to remain unchanged.  
 
Table 3 
Introduction of primary energy, final energies, and non-energy sectors in input-output of 
Iran 
Sector 
No.  energy sectors  Sector 
No.  Non-energy sectors  Sector 
No.  Non-energy sectors 
1  Crude oil and natural 
gas (primary energy)  11  Coal and lignite; peat  25  Jewelry and other products 
2  Electricity  12  Other ores and minerals  26  Constructions 
3  Water  13  Agriculture, forestry and 
fishery products  27  Wholesale and retail services 
4  Natural gas  14  Food products  28  Lodging and serving 
services 
5  Gasoline  15  textile and leathery 
products  29  Transport services 
6  Kerosene  16  Pulp, paper and wood 
products  30  Communication and 
financial services 
7  Gas oil  17  Chemical products  31  Real estate and rental 
services 
8  Fuel Oil  18  Glass and glass products  32  Research, development and 
technical services 
9  LPG  19  Basic metals and metal 
products  33  Production and maintenance 
services 
10  Other refined 
petroleum products  20  General and specific 
purpose machinery  34  Public administration 
    21  Electrical machinery  35  Education 
    22  Media equipment  36  Health services 
    23  Medical appliances  37  Other services 
    24  Transport equipment     Page | 21  
 
6.1 Direct and indirect elasticities of fuels in non-energy sectors 
Based on the methodology of decomposition of input-output price model, total, direct, and 
indirect cross-price elasticities of electricity, natural gas, gasoline, kerosene, gas oil, fuel oil, and 
LPG are calculated in the non-energy sectors.  Fig.  9  and table 4  illustrate the cross-price 
elasticities by fuel and sector.  
As explained before, the elasticities are calculated by equalizing the rate of price increase of 
each fuel to unity. Therefore, the elasticities should be interpreted in the way that how many 
percent the price of a specific non-energy sector would raise, if the price of a specific fuel 
increases twofold. For instance, the results in Table 4 show that the price elasticity of electricity 
in construction sector (sector 26) is 1.54. It means that if the price of electricity per Kwh doubles, 
the price in construction sector would increase 1.54% per unit of output. From total elasticity, 
only 0.05 percent directly  stems from increasing the electricity  price  consuming  in  the 
construction sector and the remainder (1.49%) roots in increasing the price of the other inputs 
due to indirect impact of electricity. 
 
 








11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37
Electricity Town gas Gasoline Kerosene Gas oil Fuel oil LPGPage | 22  
 
Looking to Fig. 9, it is clear that except in transportation sector (29), electricity has the 
highest cross-price elasticities across the final energies. In other words, increase in electricity 
price can raise the production cost and consequently total inflation rate, relatively more than the 
other  fuels.  The highest price elasticity of electricity is in basic metals and metal products 
(5.47%), glass and glass products (5%), and coal and lignite (4.22%). In these sectors, the price 
increase is usually due to the direct consumption of electricity. The highest indirect elasticities 
are in basic metals and metal products (1.67%), construction (1.49%), and electrical machinery 
(1.30%).  
The results for natural gas are similar to electricity. Total elasticities of natural gas in the 
main consumers of electricity are the highest, i.e. basic metals and metal products (1.50%) and 
glass and glass products (1.07%). Similarly to electricity, the price changes in the former sectors 
are because of  the huge direct consumption of natural gas in these sectors. In addition, the 
greatest indirect elasticities of natural gas belong to basic metals and metal products (0.39%), 
construction (0.33%), and electrical machinery (0.32%).  
Unsurprisingly, due to 99 percent gasoline consumption in transportation sector, increase in 
the price of gasoline affects the price of this sector mainly. If the price of gasoline increases 
twofold, transport services would experience increase in their prices by 2.85 percent. The direct 
and indirect elasticities of gasoline in transportation sector are 2.53 and 0.30 percent, 
respectively. The second and the third impressed sectors are construction and glass and glass 
products that experience total elasticities by 0.48 and 0.43 percent, respectively. Kerosene has 
one of the lowest impacts on production prices. The greatest cross-price elasticities of kerosene 
are in chemical products, other services, and production and maintenance services. 
Owing to enormous direct consumption, transport services, other ores and minerals, and 
glass and glass products have the largest cross-price elasticities of gas oil in Iran by 0.94, 0.62, 
and 0.39 percent, respectively. The most indirect effects of increase in the price of gas oil reveals 
in food products and jewelry and other products. If gas oil price doubles, price in the preceding 
sectors would increase 0.19 and 0.17 percent, respectively. The highest elasticities of fuel oil 
belong to glass and glass products (1.95%) and transport services (1.32%), mainly due to direct 
impact. Concerning the indirect price elasticities, the price of fuel oil mainly impresses 
construction, jewelry and other products, and glass and glass products indirectly. Doubling the Page | 23  
 
price of LPG raises the prices of chemical products, and lodging and serving services by 0.70 
and 0.13 percent, respectively. This impact is mainly due to direct consumption of LPG in these 
sectors. The highest indirect impact of increase in LPG price appears in chemical products and 
textile and leathery products. 
 
Table 4  
Total, direct, and indirect cross-price elasticities of fuels in non-energy sectors in Iran 
Sec. 
no. 
Electricity  Natural gas  Gasoline  Kerosene  Gas oil  Fuel oil  LPG 
Tot.  Dir.  Ind.  Tot.  Dir.  Ind.  Tot.  Dir.  Ind.  Tot.  Dir.  Ind.  Tot.  Dir.  Ind.  Tot.  Dir.  Ind.  Tot.  Dir.  Ind. 
11  4.23  3.99  0.24  0.06  0.01  0.05  0.27  0.16  0.11  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.30  0.26  0.05  0.05  0.00  0.05  0.03  0.01  0.02 
12  2.20  1.99  0.20  0.06  0.02  0.05  0.29  0.16  0.12  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.63  0.58  0.05  0.10  0.04  0.06  0.03  0.01  0.02 
13  0.59  0.28  0.31  0.06  0.00  0.06  0.26  0.10  0.16  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.22  0.14  0.08  0.07  0.00  0.06  0.03  0.01  0.02 
14  0.90  0.27  0.63  0.21  0.12  0.09  0.32  0.02  0.30  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.27  0.08  0.19  0.18  0.07  0.12  0.03  0.00  0.02 
15  2.42  1.71  0.71  0.20  0.07  0.13  0.16  0.01  0.15  0.03  0.00  0.03  0.10  0.01  0.08  0.07  0.01  0.06  0.11  0.00  0.10 
16  2.89  2.30  0.59  0.53  0.40  0.13  0.30  0.11  0.20  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.19  0.10  0.09  0.15  0.07  0.09  0.05  0.01  0.04 
17  1.31  0.83  0.48  0.48  0.35  0.13  0.16  0.03  0.13  0.16  0.13  0.03  0.11  0.04  0.06  0.08  0.02  0.06  0.70  0.60  0.11 
18  5.01  4.26  0.74  1.08  0.94  0.13  0.43  0.10  0.33  0.04  0.03  0.01  0.40  0.23  0.17  1.95  1.72  0.23  0.10  0.08  0.02 
19  5.47  3.79  1.68  1.51  1.11  0.40  0.32  0.03  0.29  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.22  0.06  0.16  0.17  0.03  0.13  0.03  0.01  0.02 
20  1.76  0.65  1.11  0.37  0.08  0.29  0.21  0.03  0.18  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.12  0.03  0.09  0.09  0.01  0.08  0.03  0.01  0.02 
21  1.93  0.63  1.30  0.38  0.05  0.33  0.24  0.04  0.20  0.02  0.00  0.01  0.13  0.03  0.10  0.09  0.00  0.09  0.05  0.01  0.05 
22  0.53  0.27  0.26  0.10  0.02  0.07  0.09  0.01  0.08  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.01  0.04  0.04  0.00  0.04  0.02  0.00  0.01 
23  1.50  0.94  0.57  0.27  0.11  0.16  0.15  0.03  0.12  0.02  0.00  0.01  0.09  0.03  0.06  0.07  0.01  0.06  0.05  0.01  0.04 
24  0.79  0.17  0.62  0.19  0.04  0.15  0.14  0.01  0.13  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.07  0.01  0.06  0.06  0.00  0.06  0.01  0.00  0.01 
25  1.19  0.00  1.19  0.27  0.04  0.23  0.43  0.17  0.26  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.22  0.04  0.18  0.30  0.03  0.27  0.10  0.03  0.07 
26  1.54  0.04  1.50  0.34  0.00  0.34  0.48  0.13  0.35  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.27  0.09  0.18  0.37  0.01  0.36  0.02  0.00  0.02 
27  1.88  1.76  0.13  0.29  0.26  0.03  0.37  0.20  0.17  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.20  0.14  0.06  0.10  0.01  0.08  0.01  0.00  0.01 
28  1.31  0.91  0.40  0.53  0.44  0.08  0.17  0.02  0.16  0.04  0.03  0.01  0.14  0.03  0.10  0.09  0.00  0.09  0.14  0.12  0.01 
29  0.47  0.24  0.23  0.07  0.03  0.05  2.84  2.54  0.30  0.02  0.00  0.01  0.94  0.84  0.11  1.32  1.19  0.13  0.03  0.00  0.03 
30  1.25  1.05  0.20  0.10  0.07  0.03  0.28  0.21  0.06  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.00 
31  0.30  0.02  0.29  0.07  0.01  0.06  0.07  0.00  0.07  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.00  0.04  0.09  0.00  0.09  0.01  0.00  0.01 
32  0.46  0.32  0.14  0.11  0.08  0.03  0.07  0.02  0.05  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.02  0.02  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.01 
33  0.77  0.53  0.24  0.15  0.10  0.05  0.27  0.19  0.08  0.10  0.09  0.01  0.11  0.07  0.04  0.05  0.01  0.04  0.03  0.02  0.02 
34  0.27  0.23  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.01  0.28  0.24  0.04  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.00 
35  0.71  0.59  0.13  0.38  0.35  0.03  0.25  0.20  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.00  0.12  0.10  0.02  0.02  0.00  0.02  0.04  0.03  0.01 
36  0.90  0.78  0.12  0.28  0.25  0.03  0.20  0.17  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.01  0.12  0.10  0.02  0.02  0.00  0.02  0.04  0.02  0.03 
37  1.62  1.37  0.24  0.53  0.47  0.06  0.40  0.32  0.08  0.11  0.10  0.01  0.19  0.16  0.04  0.16  0.12  0.04  0.07  0.06  0.02 
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6.2 Price effects on producers and consumers  
Estimation of the cross-price elasticities of fuels paves the way to examine the impact of 
energy subsidies reform on production costs and household’s expenditures and real incomes in 
Iran. Table 5 shows the domestic and regional energy prices before the reform and the price 
change after it. As it is clear, the price gap between the domestic and regional prices has been 
tremendous in Iran. Before implementation of the reform, the ratio of international prices to 
domestic prices for electricity, natural gas, gasoline, kerosene, gas oil, fuel oil, and LPG were 
4.68, 22.96, 5.36, 38.7, 37.81, 41.49, and 11.49, respectively. In the first phase of the reform 
started on December 2010, the government increased the domestic prices of the respective fuels 
by 172, 569, 300, 506, 809, 201, and 223 percent. Article 1 of the Subsidy Reform Law 
ascertains that the domestic sale prices of energy carriers should be adjusted gradually until the 
end of the 5
th Five-Year Development Plan (2010-2015), up to a level which shall not be less 
than 90 percent of Persian Gulf FOB
1 prices. However, it is not clear when and in how many 





Domestic and regional energy prices before and after the reform (Rials) 
 
Domestic energy prices at 
2008/09 – before the reform 
Average regional market 
prices at 2008/09 
Domestic energy  prices at 
2010 – after the reform 
Electricity  165  773
a  450 
Natural gas  104.5  2400
b  700 
Gasoline  1000  5362
c  4000 
Kerosene  165  6392
c  1000 
Gas oil  165  6239
c  1500 
Fuel Oil  94.5  3921
c  2000 
LPG  309.1  3605
c  1000 
a: Export price (Rials/kwh), b: Export price (Rials/m3), c: FOB price of refined petroleum products in Persian Gulf 
(Rials/liter) 
Source: MoE (2010) and MoP (2009) - 1 USD = 9,917 IR. Rials at 2008. 
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Due to the ambiguity about the next phases and the market prices of fuels in 2015, impact of 
the subsidy reform on production and consumption prices is examined in two scenarios. The first 
scenario is the price changes implemented at the first phase of the reform in 2010. While the 
reform is started recently, analyzing the price impact of the first phase is essential from the 
policy point of view. Furthermore, the results can be compared with the real initial increase in 
prices, reported by CBI. The  second  scenario  assumes that the domestic energy prices were 
raised immediately to average regional market prices in 2008/09. Practically, the results of this 
scenario can improve our understanding about the overall inflationary impacts of a full energy 
price adjustment in Iran.     
Total, direct, and indirect impact of energy subsidies reform are illustrated in Table 6 and 
Fig.  10  and  11  under two previously defined scenarios. Apparently, removing of energy 
subsidies affects the sectors glass and glass products, transport services, and basic metals and 
metal products principally. While the first phase of the reform increases the production prices of 
the former sectors by 0.59, 0.44, and 0.24  percent,  removing of total energy subsidies will 
increase the production prices by 1.40, 1.05, and 0.70, respectively. Four sectors are impressed to 
the lowest degree by increasing energy prices, i.e. research, development and technical services, 
public administration, media equipment, and real estate and rental services. It is expected that by 
removing the whole or a  part of the energy subsidies  in Iran, the production prices of the 
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Table 6 
Effects of energy subsidies reform on producer prices (%) 
Sector 
number 
Scenario 1: First phase  Scenario 2: Complete energy subsidies reform 
Tot.  Dir.  Ind.  Tot.  Dir.  Ind. 
11  0.12  0.10  0.02  0.33  0.26  0.07 
12  0.12  0.10  0.03  0.39  0.32  0.07 
13  0.05  0.02  0.03  0.17  0.07  0.09 
14  0.10  0.03  0.07  0.28  0.10  0.18 
15  0.08  0.04  0.05  0.23  0.09  0.14 
16  0.14  0.09  0.05  0.39  0.25  0.14 
17  0.10  0.06  0.04  0.37  0.25  0.12 
18  0.59  0.50  0.09  1.40  1.17  0.23 
19  0.24  0.14  0.10  0.70  0.42  0.28 
20  0.09  0.02  0.07  0.24  0.06  0.18 
21  0.09  0.02  0.08  0.26  0.05  0.21 
22  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.08  0.02  0.06 
23  0.07  0.03  0.04  0.19  0.08  0.12 
24  0.05  0.01  0.04  0.13  0.02  0.11 
25  0.13  0.02  0.11  0.34  0.05  0.29 
26  0.16  0.01  0.14  0.41  0.05  0.36 
27  0.10  0.07  0.03  0.26  0.19  0.08 
28  0.09  0.05  0.04  0.29  0.17  0.12 
29  0.44  0.39  0.05  1.05  0.92  0.13 
30  0.04  0.03  0.01  0.11  0.08  0.03 
31  0.03  0.00  0.03  0.08  0.00  0.08 
32  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.07  0.03  0.03 
33  0.05  0.03  0.02  0.17  0.12  0.06 
34  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.06  0.04  0.02 
35  0.06  0.05  0.01  0.19  0.16  0.03 
36  0.05  0.04  0.01  0.18  0.14  0.03 
37  0.13  0.10  0.02  0.38  0.32  0.06 
 
The same as price elasticities, comparison of the total and direct effects in both scenarios 
reveal that the sectors experience the greatest total impact are the main consumers of energy and 
consequently, they get the impact mostly due to the  large  share of energy in their inputs. 
Nevertheless, the picture for indirect effects is different. The main increase in the price of non-
energy inputs due to increase in energy prices occurs in the sectors construction, jewelry and 
other products, and basic metals and metal products. While increasing the energy prices in the 
first phase would increase the production prices of the former sectors by 0.01, 0.02, and 0.14 
percent, it raises the production prices via increase in the prices of the other inputs by 0.14, 0.11, Page | 27  
 
and 0.10 percent, respectively. The indirect impacts in the second scenario are 0.36, 0.29, and 
0.28 percent, respectively. 
 
 
Fig. 10. Direct and indirect impact of first phase (scenario 1) on production prices 
 
 






































Direct IndirectPage | 28  
 
To understand the impact of the reform on Iranian households, changes in consumption 
prices and real income of urban and rural households are estimated. Fig. 12 and Table 7 show 
that by removing entire energy subsidies in Iran, consumption prices would increase 45.7 percent 
that is a really strong and likely destructive shock for the households. Results reveal that the rural 
families suffer the burden of inflation more than the urban families. When the consumption price 
increases 42.8 percent in the urban areas, it grows by 55.5 percent in the rural areas. Comparison 
of the change in consumption prices in the first and the second scenarios reveal the fact that 
gradual phase out of energy subsidies can control and deteriorate devastating shocks which may 
affect households, especially the poor. The results from the first scenario show that the first 
phase of the reform will increase the consumption prices by 16.4% nationwide. Likewise the 
second scenario, the rural households would be hit by inflation more than the urban households, 
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The household’s annual real income loss would be more than 238,000 and 664,000 billion 
IR. Rials (around 21,000 and 60,000 million USD) in two scenarios, respectively. Due to more 
expenditure of urban households, what they lose is near to 3.18 and 2.68 more than the rural 
households. Because the Reform Law is mandated the government to compensate the burdened 
charges, the compensatory payments per person are calculated in Table 2.5. If the government 
removes the total energy subsidies, it should transfer 9.495 million IR. Rials to each person 
annually, whereas the transferred amount should be near to 3.405 million IR. Rials in the first 
phase of the reform. Comparing what transferred to the people in the first phase of the reform 
and what the model propose to transfer show that the payment is more than needed. At present, 
the government pays 450,000 IR. Rials to each registered person per month, while the model 
proposes to pay 283,750 IR. Rials. In addition, the model advises the payment to urban residents 
per month should be more than rural residents, i.e. 216,000 IR. Rials vis-à-vis 67,750 IR. Rials. 
This is in contrary to current even payment of the compensatory payment to all of the people, 





Effects on consumption prices and real incomes 
  National  Urban  Rural 
Household consumption price changes, Scenario 1 (%)  0.164  0.160  0.175 
Household consumption price changes, Scenario 2 (%)  0.457  0.428  0.555 
Change in household annual real income at 2010 prices, 
Scenario 1 (Million IR. Rials)  -238,333,589  -181,428,899  -56,904,689 
Change in household annual real income at 2010 prices, 
Scenario 2 (Million IR. Rials)  -664,677,472  -484,519,372  -180,158,100 
Compensatory payment per person at 2010 prices, 
Scenario 1 (Million IR. Rials)  3.405  2.592  0.813 
Compensatory payment per person at 2010 prices, 
Scenario 2 (Million IR. Rials)  9.495  6.922  2.574 
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7. Conclusions 
The study examined the impact of energy subsidies reform in Iran under two reform 
scenarios. The former is in fact what started as the first phase of the reform on December 2010, 
and the latter is removing the whole energy subsidies in one shot at 2008/09 prices. The paper 
used the input-output price model to study the impact of the reform on consumption and 
production prices in Iran, and a decomposition model to derive the cross-price elasticities of 
fuels in non-energy sectors. 
What our study found is the  tremendous inflationary impact of the complete energy 
subsidies reform on the production and consumption prices. The results show that a full reform 
would increase the consumption prices by 45.7 percent. Although rural households are impressed 
more by increase in consumption prices, families in urban areas lose more real income due to 
their more expenditure. In the reform procedure, the sectors glass and glass products, transport 
services, and basic metals and metal products  would experience the highest increase in 
production prices. In addition, looking at the cross-price elasticities confirms that electricity and 
gasoline have the highest impact on the production prices. 
To propose some policy implications, the following points can be mentioned. First, a gradual 
and phased reform imposes less inflation on producers and households and provides enough 
room for policy makers to modify the next phases to alleviate the negative effects. Second, while 
the real income losses of households are different due to their income group or geographical 
attitude and location, the government should compensate their loss discriminately. Finally, while 
increase in the prices of some fuels such as electricity and gasoline has more inflationary impacts, 
the pace of the reform for these fuels should be more gradual. 
As the last considerable point, it is essential to mention the results of the study should be 
interpreted cautiously. First, the input-output table used in this study is for 2001. This raises our 
concerns about the rigidity of the economic structure in Iran after a decade. Second, the Leontief 
price model has some deficiencies due to its restrictive assumptions  such as the lack of 
substitution between  factors and the null role of final demand in the economy price setting. 
However, the general equilibrium perspective of the model makes it possible to release the 
partial analyses and have a better understanding about the possible negative consequences of the 
reform at two production and consumer levels.  Page | 31  
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